Enhancing Child Safety and Online Technologies

Final Report of the Internet Safety Technical Task Force to the Multi-State Working Group on Social Networking of State Attorneys General of the United States

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Multi-State Working Group on Social Networking of
State Attorneys General of the United States

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- Center for Democracy & Technology
- Comcast
- Community Connect Inc.
- ConnectSafely.org
- Enough Is Enough
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- IDology, Inc.

Institute for Policy Innovation
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Microsoft Corp
MTV Networks/Viacom.
MySpace and Fox Interactive Media
National Center for Missing & Exploited Children
The Progress & Freedom Foundation
Sentinel Tech Holding Corp.
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Verizon Communications, Inc.
Xanga
Yahoo!, Inc.
Wiredsafety.org
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A Reader’s Guide to Enhancing Child Safety

John Palfrey*
July, 2009

Digital environments are becoming the most important public spaces of the 21st century. These digital spaces are where many young people—and many older people—spend enormous amounts of time. These spaces are today akin to public parks and to schoolyards. These are environments where many social lives take place, where nearly all information can be found and republished, and where important functions like learning and participation in civic life occur. With every passing year, more and more of life is taking place in ways that are mediated by digital technologies—by people young and old.

Just as there are great things about life online, so, too, are there risks associated with it. But many young people do not distinguish between life online and life offline—it is just life. All of us—teachers, parents, law enforcement officers, politicians—need to heed this lesson that our children are teaching us. And as we seek to protect our kids in this hybrid world, we need to be sure not to violate Constitutional protections for speech and privacy. Nowhere in the world is this balance being struck well today; nowhere in the world do we yet see ample, balanced protection of safety and of civil liberties online. To protect our children’s safety in this new, hybrid world while maintaining civil liberties and helping children to learn along the way is a noble and important goal.

* John Palfrey is Henry N. Ess Professor of Law and Vice Dean for Library and Information Resources at Harvard Law School. He is also a faculty director of the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard University. This overview draws upon the research for a co-authored book, Born Digital: Understanding the First Generation of Digital Natives (2008) with Urs Gasser, as well as many conversations with danah boyd, Dena Sacco, Internet Safety Technical Task Force Members, and others about Internet safety issues and children.
As we seek to understand emerging problems online—such as the myriad threats to the safety of our children—and to anticipate a future that seems to be arriving faster and faster, we have to understand our children and our grandchildren and how they are different. There are profound differences in terms of how many of them are leading their lives as compared to some of us who are their parents and grandparents. Take identity, for instance, which is one of the attributes of how young people often use technologies and relate to the world differently than those who came before. Young people shape their identities by what they wear and who their friends are, just as they always have. But they also shape their identities through profiles in online social networks, through the personalities that they develop through instant messaging and texting and Twittering, and through blogs and LiveJournals and their avatars in games and virtual worlds. Identity is shaped in this converged space of online and offline. And as they spend all this time online, so too do they run risks in online spaces, just as they do offline.

Young people interact with both friends and strangers online. Their understanding of the word “friend,” in fact, is changing. They may consider someone they have never met, other than in an online chatroom, to be a close friend. They spend a great deal of time online with their friends—as they play games together, plan something that they might do later, share music and movies, or just chat—and chat, and chat (or: text, and text, and text). Sometimes friends do terrible things to one other. Sometimes, they are mean to one another in ways that they would not be in real space, when face to face; after all, it’s much easier to leave a hard conversation online than it is offline. Other times, these are just the spaces where growing up takes place, with good and bad.

It’s no surprise that there should be problems that arise online. These are places where kids are spending a great deal of time, where they are playing and learning and just hanging out. They leave a lot of information about themselves around these places. That information is sometimes accessible to those whom they do not know. And they are often experimenting with who they are and how they want to interact with other people.

It is against this backdrop that we undertook the work of the Internet Safety Technical Task Force. The Attorneys General who commissioned the work of this Task Force asked us to consider, in particular, whether technologies could help make kids safer online. They told us that their investigators are experiencing a disturbing trend: more and more, they were finding that a young person online, especially in social networks, was likely to encounter a sexual predator. Many parents have told us of their similar fears. As Task Force members, we have taken these concerns to heart.
The primary thing that joined each of the Task Force members to one another was our shared sense of purpose: as parents, teachers, and professionals, we care about making the world safer for all children. We came from a very broad range of perspectives, political and otherwise. Members represented 29 different organizations, drawn from some of the largest social networks from around the world, prominent technology companies, non-profit advocacy groups, and academia. We did not agree on every topic by any means, but we did share a sense of common purpose.

Readers of this book will not be surprised that there are complicated politics involved in this topic. The way that this report was compiled may enable the careful reader to understand some of these political tensions. The primary report was drafted by the team members from the Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University which chaired the Task Force. We as the Berkman Center team took seriously all comments that we received from Task Force members and the public. It was not possible to incorporate all these proposed changes, but we sought to describe as clearly as we could the areas of consensus.

Some of the most controversial aspects in this area are revealed in the pages of this book. After the main report had been finalized, we invited each Task Force member to contribute a one-page response to highlight support or areas of disagreement with the findings of the Task Force at large. These one-page responses offer a glimpse of where broader disagreement continues to divide those who work on these issues. The responses of some Attorneys General to the release of this report, in the mainstream press and through public statements, likewise reveal these fault lines.

The first area of disagreement is about the relative degree of risk of sexual predation as compared to other safety concerns. Academic researchers made plain their findings, more or less universally, that the risk of sexual predation is real and worrisome, but that the online environment has not made kids more at risk than they have been in the past. Others disagree vehemently with these findings, contending that the advent of social networks and other online services has given rise to new and severe risks to kids. No one disagrees that there is a risk of sexual predation online. The issue that is not settled is what the exact risk is, to whom it is most acute, and how to address it. The one-page submissions by AT&T, FOSI and Connect Safely, for instance, point to various aspects of how to approach this issue of research and its implications.

Another area of dispute centers on how to think about the growth of online bullying alongside the continuing risk of sexual predation. Researchers presented their findings that bullying online is a growing concern for kids, parents and teachers. Young people do more harm to one another—peer to peer—
than adults do to them. This is a very important point. We need to think in terms of how “friends” act toward one another just as much as we think about how strangers might reach our children. The problems that can occur are terrible here, too, and they are increasingly being reported as common. The psychological harm done to young people by their peers online can be devastating. But others disagree, arguing that an emphasis in the safety debate on bullying does not make sense. The biggest fear (and corresponding greatest harm), they argue, is predation, not bullying, and any shift in emphasis away from online predation is to be avoided.

The debate about youth and access to harmful online content, too, continues to rage, as it has since the advent of widespread use of the Internet. Young people can access much more content—information and imagery and just about any kind of media one can imagine—online than they ever could before. Sometimes, they are accessing information that helps them to learn about their world—to expand their horizons, to help them to think more critically, to give them a way into a public discourse where they can contribute their own voices, to find things that could never be housed in a single library. For some kids, learning on their own online is a big part of their growing up, and it’s great. But it’s also easy to access pornography and, with some effort, young people may access child pornography. This is not entirely new: of course, young people have sought out pornography in the past, or been presented with it by a friend or an older cousin or sibling. The difference today is its easy access online, from anywhere at any time. The debate between those who emphasize the importance of public morals and those who emphasize the right to free expression has not abated. Consider the one-page submission by Enough is Enough for consideration of these issues.

The question of how to respond to each of these threats to safety—predation, bullying, and access to harmful and unwanted content—gives rise to a further series of differences between perspectives. Some argue that the use of technologies, such as online identity authentication and age verification in particular, ought to be widespread, if not mandatory, and that young people will be much safer if we were to do so. A less-strong version of this argument draws upon the notion that the technologies are sufficiently malleable that they offer enormous promise for protecting kids from a range of risks. Others argue that, when faced with these problems, we too quickly turn to the idea that technology can solve these problems that technology has wrought—and that this is a mistake. The extensive use of strong authentication and age verification technologies will not solve the problem, they argue, and will bring with them negative externalities, including risks to innovation, free expression and privacy. For a sense of the different viewpoints on this topic, consider in particular the articulate submissions of Aristotle and IDology on the one hand.
and those of the Center for Democracy and Technology, the Institute for Policy Innovation, and the Progress and Freedom Foundation on the other.

Finally, there is extensive debate about whether we ought to mandate any particular technology as a solution to child safety. Legislation has been filed at the state and federal levels in the United States and in other countries in recent years that would require the use of particular technologies in the interest of protecting children. The Task Force members all agreed that such a mandate does not make sense at this time. The AOL-Bebo submission, for instance, makes the case for this perspective. That said, this debate is far from settled; despite the clear statement of our Task Force, legislators continue to propose such legislation in a variety of contexts.

These problems of online life are neither easily nor quickly solved. All serious observers agree on this score. These problems are so complex, and changing so quickly, as to defy easy, one-off answers. We know that we cannot expect that a single, static technological approach will keep our kids from danger. We can’t just “pass a law” against these things and imagine that we can enforce that law in the way we’ve always enforced the law and hope that all will be well. The problems don’t lend themselves to such easy answers. Of course, we can and should pass laws against these crimes and enforce them. It is crucial that we have the laws, policies, and legal infrastructure sufficient to enable enforcement—including in these new environments.

More important than any law or any technology, though, is our commitment to a robust public dialogue about child safety. No one single person has all the answers. This Task Force report is meant as a contribution to this ongoing public dialogue. The Obama Administration is leading a similar effort through the National Telecommunications and Information Administration in 2009, established by the “Protecting Children in the 21st Century Act,” which will push work and discussion on this topic further forward. Many of the members of our Task Force are serving on this NTIA working group.

It is imperative that we listen to a range of credible perspectives on this politicized topic. We need to commit ourselves to basing our decision-making on the facts, not on mere intuition, political beliefs, or narrow financial interests. In turn, we need broad public education about the best practices—for young people, for parents, for teachers, for law enforcement, and for technology companies—about how to keep kids safe. We need to devote ourselves to getting skills and tools into the right hands—especially in the hands of our kids and their friends. And we have no choice but to cooperate in meeting these challenges together, rather than letting our different views separate us. The stakes are simply too high to do otherwise.
Acknowledgments

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