

Jurisprudence

Theory and Context

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Seventh Edition

Brian Bix

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For Joseph Raz

Preface to the Seventh Edition

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This book derives from efforts over the course of two decades to teach jurisprudence: in particular, the struggle to explain some of the more difficult ideas in the area in a way that could be understood by those new to the field, without at the same time simplifying the ideas to the point of distortion. This text is grounded in a combination of frustrations: the frustration I sometimes feel as a teacher, when I am unable to get across the beauty and subtlety of the great writers in legal theory¹; and the frustration my students sometimes feel, when they are unable to understand me, due to my inability to explain the material in terms they can comprehend.

I do not underestimate the difficulty of the task I have set myself, and I am sure that this text does not always achieve all that it sets out to do. At the least, I hope that I do not appear to be hiding my failures behind legal or philosophical jargon. H. L. A. Hart once wrote the following in the course of discussing an assertion made by the American judge and theorist Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.:

“To make this discovery with Holmes is to be with a guide whose words may leave you unconvinced, sometimes even repelled, but never mystified. Like our own [John] Austin . . . Holmes was sometimes clearly wrong; but again like Austin he was always wrong clearly.”²

I do not purport to be able to offer the powerful insights or the elegant prose of Holmes and Hart, but I do strive to emulate them in the more modest, but still difficult task, of expressing ideas in a sufficiently straightforward manner such that when I am wrong, I am “wrong clearly”.

This book is part introductory text and part commentary. In the preface to his classic text, *The Concept of Law*, Hart stated his hope that his book would “discourage the belief that a book on legal theory is

¹ Unlike some writers, e.g. William Twining, “Academic Law and Legal Philosophy: The Significance of Herbert Hart”, (1979) 95 *Law Quarterly Review* 557 at 565–580, and Roger Cotterrell, “Why Jurisprudence is Not Legal Philosophy”, 5 *Jurisprudence* 41 (2014), I do not distinguish between “jurisprudence”, “legal theory”, and “legal philosophy”, and I will use those terms interchangeably.

² H. L. A. Hart, “Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals”, 71 *Harvard Law Review* 593 at 593 (1958).

primarily a book from which one learns what other books contain.”³ My aims are less ambitious: the present text *is* a book meant to inform readers what other books contain—the idea being that the primary texts are not always as accessible as they might be. However, this book is distinctly *not* meant as a substitute for reading those primary texts: the hope and the assumption is that readers will go to the primary texts first, and will return to them again after obtaining whatever guidance is to be offered in these pages. Additionally, there are a number of places in the text where I go beyond a mere reporting of the debate, and try to add my own views to the discussion. This is especially true of Chapters 2 and 11, but, in smaller ways, throughout the other chapters of the book as well.

0-2 WHY JURISPRUDENCE?

Why study jurisprudence?

For many students, the question has a simple answer: for them, it is a required course which they must pass in order to graduate. For students in this situation, the questions about any jurisprudence book will be whether it can help them to learn enough of the material to get them where they need to be: passing the course (or doing sufficiently well in the course that their overall class standing is not adversely affected). However, even students who have such a minimal survival attitude towards the subject might want to know what further advantage they might obtain from whatever knowledge of the subject they happen to pick up.

At the practical level, reading and participating in jurisprudential discussions develops the ability to analyse and to think critically and creatively about the law. Such skills are always useful in legal practice, particularly when facing novel questions within the law or when trying to formulate and advocate novel approaches to legal problems. So even those who need a “bottom line” justification for whatever they do should be able to find reason to read legal theory.

There is also a sense that philosophy, even where it does not have direct applications to grades or to practice, has many indirect benefits. Philosophy trains one to think sharply and logically; one learns how to find the weaknesses in other people’s arguments, and in one’s own; and one learns how to evaluate and defend, as well as attack, claims and positions. Philosophy could thus be seen as a kind of mental exercise program, on a par with chess or bridge (or theology). Giving the centrality of analytical skills to what both lawyers and law students do, one should not quickly dismiss any activity that can help one improve those abilities.

³ H. L. A. Hart, *The Concept of Law* (3rd ed., Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2012), p. vi.

At a professional level, jurisprudence is the way lawyers and judges reflect on what they do and what their role is within society. This truth is reflected by the way jurisprudence is taught as part of a *university* education in the law, where law is considered not merely as a trade to be learned (like carpentry or fixing automobiles) but as an intellectual pursuit. For those who believe that only the reflective life is worth living, and who also spend most of their waking hours working within (or around) the legal system, there are strong reasons to want to think deeply about the nature and function of law, the legal system, and the legal profession.

Finally, for some (whether the blessed or the cursed, one cannot say), jurisprudence is interesting and enjoyable on its own, whatever its other uses and benefits. There will always be some for whom learning is interesting and valuable in itself, even if it does not lead to greater wealth, greater self-awareness, or greater social progress.

THE SELECTION OF TOPICS

One can find entire books on many of the topics discussed in the present volume in short chapters (or parts of chapters). I have done my best to offer overviews that do not sacrifice the difficulty of the subjects, but I fear that some mis-reading is inevitable in any summary. In part to compensate for the necessarily abbreviated nature of what is offered, a list of “Suggested Further Reading” is offered at the end of each chapter (and there are footnote citations to the primary texts in the course of the chapters) for those who wish to locate longer and fuller discussions of certain topics.

0-3

A related problem is that in the limited space available, I could not include all the topics that are associated with jurisprudence (a course whose content varies greatly from university to university, and even from teacher to teacher in the same university). The variety of topics included in one source or another under the category of jurisprudence is vast, so inevitably there always seems to be more missing from than present in any text. Through my silence (or brevity), I do not mean to imply that the topics not covered are not interesting, not important, or not properly part of jurisprudence.

It is inevitable that those using this book will find some chapters more useful for their purposes than others, even (or especially) if they are students using this book to accompany a general jurisprudence course. In particular, the topics in the first part of the book are usually not covered in university courses, though I believe that thinking through some of the questions raised there might help one gain a deeper or more coherent view of jurisprudence as a whole.

One caveat I must offer is that references to legal practice offered in

this book will be primarily to the practices in the American and English⁴ legal systems, as these are the systems with which I am most familiar. It is likely (though far from certain) that any comments based on those two legal systems would be roughly generalised to cover all common law systems. The extent to which my lack of familiarity with civil law systems biases my views about legal theory and about the nature of law I must leave to others to judge.

I take seriously the obligation that comes with publishing a new edition of an existing book. I believe that any new edition should offer resources that the prior edition did not have. While there is rarely time to revisit and rewrite everything, in the preparation of the seventh edition of this book, many of the chapters have been expanded, discussions of the most recent scholarship have been added throughout, and many topics have been significantly rethought. While there are changes throughout the book, the most extensive changes are located in Chapters 2, 3, 7, 14, 17 and 18.

Where possible, I have tried to include references (especially in each chapter's "Suggested Further Reading" list) that are readily accessible: e.g., articles in well-known journals that would be available in most law libraries or from electronic law journal collections (like *Hein Online*), and articles from Internet sources (like *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (plato.stanford.edu) and the Social Services Research Network (www.ssrn.com)) that are available without cost (at least at the time of writing).

Work on this book often overlapped with work I was doing for other smaller projects: sometimes work done for the book was borrowed for other projects, and sometimes I found that work done for other projects could be usefully incorporated in the book. An earlier version of parts of Chapter 2 appeared in "Conceptual Questions and Jurisprudence", 1 *Legal Theory* 415 (1995); earlier versions of parts of Chapters 5, 6, and 7 appeared in "Natural Law Theory", in *A Companion to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory* (D. Patterson, ed., Blackwell, Oxford, 1996, 2nd ed., 2010); an earlier version of brief sections of Chapters 1 and 7 appeared in "Questions in Legal Interpretation", in *Law and Interpretation* (A. Marmor, ed., Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995), pp. 137–154; and an earlier version of parts of Chapters 1, 2, and 14 appeared in "Questions in Legal Interpretation", 18 *Tel Aviv Law Review* 463 (1994) (translated into Hebrew). I am grateful to the publishers of these texts for allowing me permission to use material from those articles.

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⁴ I am following the usual convention of using the term "English legal system" to refer to the legal system that extends over both England and Wales.

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